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COMMENT
AN INDETERMINATE MIX OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION: THE UNDERTOW OF IN FoRMA PAUPERiS
INTRODUCTION
In 1994 a Mississippi trial court took away Melissa L. Brooks's
right to be the legal mother of her own children; her name was removed
from their birth certificates.' When Ms. Brooks attempted to appeal the
termination of her parental rights, Mississippi law required her to pay for
the necessary transcripts to obtain such an appeal.' Unable to pay the
transcript expense, Ms. Brooks requested that the state supreme court
waive this requirement and allow her to proceed in forma pauperis The
Mississippi Supreme Court denied her request.' Simply put, Ms. Brooks
could not legally question the termination of her parental rights because
she was poor.
Believing she had a constitutional right to proceed in forma pau-
peris, Ms. Brooks appealed her case to the United States Supreme Court.
In M.L.B. v. S.LJ., Ms. Brooks struggled through the Court's complex in
forma pauperis jurisprudence in order to gain an appeal of her parental
rights termination. Ms. Brooks ultimately won her Supreme Court case
because the private interest involved, her parental right, was too impor-
tant to ignore.' In M.L.B., the private interest overcame the doctrinal dif-
ficulties. Not every indigent, however, will be as lucky as Ms. Brooks.
While past in forma pauperis decisions have generally expanded
protections for the poor, and at least on the surface appear consistent,
there are potentially devastating problems with this doctrine. In forma
pauperis lies within the confusing overlap of fundamental rights juris-
prudence of equal protection and due process. As a result, Supreme
Court in forma pauperis decisions have consistently cited varying con-
stitutional grounds. The doctrine in this area thus lies indeterminate.
With indeterminacy comes uncertainty and the potential for abuse by
judges. As such, danger lurks in the undertow below the apparently calm
and consistent surface of in forma pauperis protection. This Comment
analyzes this dangerous doctrinal undertow and attempts to provide a
definitive current of analysis.
1. David G. Savage, Ruling for a Mother's Rights Puts Human Face on Supreme Court's
Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 40.
2. M.L.B.v.S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555,560(1996).
3. In forma pauperis "[diescribes permission given to a poor person (i.e., indigent) to pro-
ceed without liability for court fees or costs." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990).
4. M.L.B., 117S.Ctat560.
5. See id. at 563-69.
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Part I of this Comment analyzes the similar historical and doctrinal
roots of due process and equal protection jurisprudence. Part I also places
this analysis within the court access setting. Part II presents the M.L.B.
case, focusing on each method of Fourteenth Amendment analysis upon
which the majority, concurrence, and dissent are founded. Part Inl illus-
trates the confusion in the doctrine and the resulting problems. It then
proposes a solution. Part IV underscores the need to choose a definitive
doctrinal direction so that appropriate in forma pauperis analysis is en-
sured.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment represents one device in a long pro-
gression that is designed to protect individuals from the potentially awe-
some power of the state. While much of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine
is seen as a lineage, parts of that lineage overlap in concept and scope.
These overlapping sections of doctrine are fundamental to understanding
the right to court access predicament.
A. Historical Roots of Overlap
In the broadest sense, in forma pauperis protection for indigents is
merely the latest expansion of protection that has grown since the Magna
Carta.6 In 1225, the Magna Carta declared that no "freeman" could be
denied his freedom or land without fair hearing before some sort of
body.' One hundred twenty years later this concept was enforced by an-
other English legal provision that reiterated similar protections, this time
specifying the familiar words, "by due process of law." These provisions
6. Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST.
COMMENT 339, 340 (1987). At the heart of Eberle's commentary is the fact that these particular
laws, and their underlying original impulse of due process, was to protect the process itself, namely
notice and the right to answer legal allegations before a court of law. Id.
7. Eberle notes the applicable text:
No Freeman shall be taken, or otherwise imprisoned, or be disseized of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or destroyed; nor we will not pass
upon him, nor.condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the
Land.
Id. (citing the original Latin text, 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225)).
The Supreme Court itself has recognized the implications of the Magna Carta in the informa
pauperis situation that this Comment addresses. The Court stated:
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem.
People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at
least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Carta .... These
pledges were unquestionably steps toward a fairer and more nearly equal application of
criminal justice. In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious dis-
criminations between persons and different groups of persons.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956).
8. Eberle notes the full text of the 1354 English statute: "That no Man of what Estate or
Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinher-
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grew in importance, eventually becoming the rallying cry of the English
constitutionalists of the 1600s." These pioneers were the philosophical
forefathers of the American legislators and judges who in the 1800s
opened the door for the establishment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Incorporated in American government in sources ranging from state con-
stitutions to the United States Supreme Court, political ideas from six
hundred years ago emerged again and again, and were finally adopted by
Congress in 1868."
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Setting: Overlapping Tests and Goals
Ensuring court access for indigents is an example of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of individual rights from unwarranted govern-
mental interference. These individual rights derive, in great part, from
the weight of the words, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'2 Out of these
words grew two distinct lines of constitutional protection, due process
and equal protection.
The Court identifies two types of due process: substantive and pro-
cedural. Procedural due process encompasses that process which is due
before the government can take away an individual's life, liberty, or
property.'3 In determining whether a procedural due process violation
occurred the Court will weigh the individual and governmental inter-
ests."
The Court begins substantive due process analysis with a determi-
nation of the right's fundamental/non-fundamental nature. Such analysis
ited, nor be put to death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law." Eberle, supra
note 6, at 340 (citing 28 Edw. 3 ch. 3 (1354)).
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id. at 341-42.
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see also David Crump, How Do
the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judi-
cialAlchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 810-11 (1996).
14. For the assessment of challenged state procedures, the Court has adopted the Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process test. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-
600 (1979). The Court in Mathews stated the test as a balance and consideration of three factors: (1)
the private interest involved; (2) the risk that the procedures in question will erroneously usurp that
ight; and (3) the justification or interest that the Government has in using such procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31
(1981) (determining that the Mathews test applies to parental termination proceedings).
15. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). Initially, substantive due process was seen as
only providing protection from economic regulation that impinged upon liberty and, as such, only
"economic" fundamental rights. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out
of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 318 (1991). The notion of substantive due
process, however, gradually changed and expanded. See Anthony C. Cicia, A Wolf in Sheep's
1998]
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is often subjective and is a point of contention among the Justices.'6 After
such a determination, the Court subjects the infringement on the right to
the appropriate level of scrutiny under which the governmental interest is
placed,'" through a device called a "means-end scrutiny test.""8 Under this
framework, the Court examines the end goal of the infringing statute and
the means by which the state attempts to achieve these results.'9
Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241 (1996). Substantive due process rights came to be recognized under
the Fourteenth Amendment's zone of privacy protection. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to freedom of marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to con-
traception). Yet, the judicial conservatism present in the 1980s stemmed this expansion and threat-
ened the existence of the doctrine itself, as exemplified in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
In Bowers, the Court determined that no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy existed. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 190-91. The Court went further, stating:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fun-
damental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
Id. at 194.
16. The fundamental rights debate is often a clash between originalists and non-originalists.
See David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 895, 897 (1993). Originalists argue that the Constitution should be read strictly and thus only
the specific rights described therein should be recognized. Id. at 897-98. At the heart of the origi-
nalist position is the notion that the Court should engage in legal analysis, not political policy mak-
ing. Id. The solution for originalists, then, is an ethic of restraint and neutrality couched in the guises
of striving for the Framers' original intention of the text. Id. at 898-99. In this manner, the independ-
ent political views of a particular judge will hopefully be weeded out of the analysis mix. Id. at 899.
Non-originalists, sometimes called fundamental rights theorists, argue that the Constitution
was never intended to be an all inclusive laundry list of fundamental rights. Id. at 900. Rather, they
argue that the Constitution presents a set of "general moral concepts." Id. In this manner they posit
that non-originalism does not ignore the precepts of the Constitution at all, rather, non-originalism is
just a different interpretation of the Constitution's meaning. Id. From these "general moral con-
cepts," rights are distilled and applied to particular situations. Id. This debate between originalists
and non-originalists, while highly intriguing, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
From either of theese two positions, the Court has been clear that expanding the scope of
substantive due process is no cavalier endeavor. The Court clearly stated:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of sub-
stantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted
area are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exer-
cise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
17. If the Court determines that the right violated was fundamental, then the state must first
prove that the state interest in violating that fundamental right is "narrowly tailored to serve some
compelling state interest" Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02. In order for a law to be considered narrowly
tailored it must be "the least onerous alternative available for achieving the purpose [compelling
state interest]." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
REv. 625, 638 (1992).
If the right violated is deemed not to be fundamental, then through a "means-end scrutiny"
test the burden is on the individual, id. at 643-44, to prove that the law infringing the right is not
rationally related to some legitimate state interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271
(1997). This is known as the rational basis test. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
18. Galloway, supra note 17, at 627.
19. Id.
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The Equal Protection Clause"0 protects rights that are either "explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." '  Additionally, the
Equal Protection Clause "embodies a general rule that States must treat
like cases alike but may treat unlike cases [dissimilarly],"' as long as that
dissimilarity is not based upon a suspect classification or a fundamental
right.' At the highest level of scrutiny there are two possible analytical
approaches. Under one, if a law has an "invidious discriminatory pur-
pose," ' disproportionately harming a group of people similarly situated
to others and the statute classifies individuals in a suspect manner, the
respondent State must prove a compelling state interest for such dis-
crimination.' Under the other, if the law unequally burdens a fundamen-
tal right in its classification (regardless of whether that classification is
suspect), a compelling interest must also exist. '
As the Court duly notes, most state laws classify individuals in
some manner." However, the Court recognizes few classifications as
suspect. Only race,28 national origin," and ethnicity ° currently qualify.
Wealth is the classification at issue in court access situations, as statutes
that set fees for court access inherently classify individuals into those
20. "No state shall ... deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
22. Vao v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2297 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). The Court underscored its focus on
such particularized equal protection when it noted that
To be sure, the constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily apply
equally to all persons. "he Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact... to be treated in law as though they are the same.".. . Hence, legislation may im-
pose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the
Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the
distinctions that are drawn have "some relevance to the purpose for which the classifica-
tion is made."
Id. at 309 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
24. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976). Under this test, the Court ruled that
mere statistical demonstration of discrimination is inadequate to prove violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id. at 240.
25. Id. If no fundamental right is violated, yet the statute burdens a suspect class, the state
must still show the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Russell W. Gallo-
way, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 130 (1989). There can
also be a lower level of scrutiny yet still above rationality review called intermediate scrutiny. This
scrutiny is implicated when a law burdens a quasi-suspect class. Id. If a law does not burden a fun-
damental right or suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Court affords the law in question "a strong
presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Consequently, the individual will
then have to prove that the law does not rationally relate to some legitimate state interest. See gener-
ally Christopher E. Austin, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 768, 776-77 (1982) (discussing equal protection analysis in the context of court access fees).
26. Galloway, supra note 25, at 130.
27. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271-72(1979).
28. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional a law
segregating public schools on the basis of race).
29. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
30. See, e.g., id. at 214.
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who can and cannot pay.3' However, the Court does not recognize wealth
as a suspect classification.32 Furthermore, in the in forma pauperis sce-
nario, the Court considers this inevitable classification as rationally re-
lated to the efficient administration of state courts.
While the lines of constitutional protection emanating from the
Fourteenth Amendment have separate tests, the lines blur and overlap.
Right to court access situations underscore this overlap. The Court, un-
der rational relation analysis, has consistently upheld state court fee re-
quirements. As such, an indigent must argue for a heightened level of
scrutiny under either due process or equal protection.36 Under due process
the indigent must argue that some fundamental right was taken away
without due process. Under an equal protection analysis the indigent
must argue that the statute classified based upon wealth or unequally
burdened a fundamental right in its classification.
The most significant factor in creating the overlap between due proc-
ess and equal protection analyses in right to court access cases is that the
Court does not find wealth a suspect classification. Once the Court re-
moves the ability of the indigent to argue a suspect classification, the
only remaining method of recovery is to implicate a fundamental right.
This reality exposes the indigent to rather subjective and indeterminate
judicial analyses. A closer look at the right to court access cases eluci-
dates this, overlap.
C. The Right to Court Access: Due Process and Equal Protection
Overlap in Action
Access to the courts encompasses ideas about a process that is due,
equal access to that process, liberties and freedoms that are unfairly con-
strained, and judicial relief.38 As a result, in forma pauperis analysis in-
volves many issues. At a surface level the denial of court access appears
a pure denial of fundamental process, and therefore, a denial of proce-
31. See Austin, supra note 25, at 768.
32. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
33. The Court explained that "[ijn the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imper-
fect." Id. at 485.
34. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) ("We observe first that the Court's decisions
concerning access to judicial processes ... reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.").
At their respective cores, due process and equal protection really deal with the same concern, as has
been noted. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confuisions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 310 (1993) ("In its commonest form, substantive
due process doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching principle-also embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause-that government cannot be arbitrary." (citation omitted)).
35. See Austin, supra note 25, at 777-78.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
38. See generally Austin, supra note 25 (discussing various methods of constitutional analysis
posited by commentators as the correct framework in which to view court access situations).
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dural due process. Such a denial also triggers equal protection concerns,
as a distinct group of individuals (the poor) are denied equal treatment
under the law. At a deeper level, if the denial of process or the discrimi-
nation itself implicates a fundamental right, substantive due process may
be triggered. All of these issues influence the form of the in forma pau-
peris piecemealed together by the Court.
The following cases illustrate the extent to which the Justices dis-
agree on what constitutional test to apply: whether to use equal protec-
tion, due process, or both. The evolution of the right to court access and
its blurred due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights impli-
cations began in 1956 with the case of Griffin v. Illinois.39
In Griffin, two individuals were convicted of armed robbery and
subsequently appealed their convictions to the Illinois Appellate Court. '
Illinois state law granted them this right to appeal. However, Illinois law
also dictated that the appellant present particular documents to the ap-
pellate court. These documents were almost impossible to prepare with-
out obtaining full trial transcripts."' Because these defendants were poor
and could not afford to pay for these transcripts they requested a fee
waiver. '2 The Illinois Supreme Court denied this request. 3 On appeal the
U.S. Supreme Court declared the Illinois law unconstitutional, violating
the Fourteenth Amendment on both due process and equal protection
grounds."
The Court invoked both due process and equal protection, stating
that "our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protec-
tion both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious
discrimination between persons and different groups of persons."' Un-
derscoring the equal protection nature of informa pauperis scenarios the
Court noted that "[tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has." The Court made it
clear that states were not required to grant such appeals. Once a state
afforded individuals that right, however, it could not create an arbitrary
monetary bar to exercising that right."
Griffin spawned many cases that further defined the right of court
access for indigent appellants. The following are the essential highlights
in that series of cases. These cases further demonstrate the overlap be-
39. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
40. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-14.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 15.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 17-19.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 18-19.
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tween due process and equal protection that currently exists in this area
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In 1971, the Court decided two key cases which expanded the in
forma pauperis doctrine established in Griffin. In Mayer v. City of Chi-
cago,' the Griffin holding was extended on due process grounds to cover
appeals of non-felony criminal cases, essentially including all criminal
appeals under the Griffin umbrella.'9 The Mayer Court, however, never
specifically implicated due process or equal protection alone as the basis
for its decision. Rather, the Court based its ruling on the "unreasoned
distinction" between felony and non-felony convictions.' The Court's
analysis, however, possessed a distinct equal protection flavor. The "un-
reasoned distinction" discussion focused on the rule's unreasonable and
differential treatment of similarly situated individuals.'
The Court, in 1971, also decided Boddie v. Connecticut.2 In Boddie,
the Court held that the private interest in dissolving a marriage was of
such importance that the state fiscal interest in demanding a fee for such
a court transaction violated the Due Process Clause 3 Focusing on the
basic importance of the right of marriage, the Court tied its analysis to
the due process historical framework of protection for fundamental
rights. ' In his concurrence, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority, yet
believed that the case also presented a classic equal protection problem.55
He believed that while the majority focused only on due process, the
very fact that the case dealt with a denial of a hearing additionally impli-
cated analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.' While disagreeing
with the majority and Justice Brennan, dissenting Justice Black based his
reasoning on both equal protection and due process. 7
The expansion of the exemption of court access fees for indigents
did find its limits. In United States v. Kras,58 the Court held that fees re-
quired to file a bankruptcy petition did not violate the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Court
stated that bankruptcy is different than marriage in that "[tihe Boddie
appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their
48. 404U.S. 189 (1971).
49. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 193-99.
50. Id. at 195.
51. Id. at 195-98.
52. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
53. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
54. Id. at 376 ("Recognition of this (due process] theoretical framework illuminates the pre-
cise issue presented in this case. As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage
involves interests of basic importance to our society.").
55. Id. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 388.
57. Id. at 390-94 (Black, J., dissenting).
58. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
59. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446.
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freedom to pursue other protected associational activities." Although
Kras's desire to start anew financially was important, it did "not rise to
the same constitutional level."'
The Kras Court noted that the appellant could dissolve his debt in
other manners. The legal remedy of bankruptcy, while an option, was not
the only option available to the appellant. '2 Also, the "state monopoly" on
marriage was an important factor in Boddie, and this factor distinguished
the two scenarios. 3 The Court based much of its analysis on the absence
of a fundamental right and utilized a due process approach."
The Kras Court went further yet, implicating equal protection as
grounds for ruling in favor of the government. In the process, the Court
underscored the overlap between due process and equal protection in
such situations.' The Court noted that since bankruptcy does not rise to
the level of a fundamental right, as it falls into the area of economics and
social welfare, strict scrutiny cannot be applied to the government regu-
lation.' In the absence of strict scrutiny the Court applied the rational-
relation test, finding the filing fees constitutional. 7
In Ortwein v. Schwab,' the Court held that a filing fee for welfare
appeals did not violate the Due Process Clause because no fundamental
right was at stake. ' The Court reiterated that the poor are not a suspect
class and the government's financial interest in supporting its court sys-
tem was rational." The Court, as it did in Kras, noted the non-
fundamental nature of the private interest in welfare.' To bolster its ar-
gument the Court delineated that welfare payments are "in the area of
economics and social welfare," '72 and as such bring the analysis down to
the rational-relation level."
In addition, the Ortwein Court implicated procedural due process,
stating that "procedural due process requires that a welfare recipient be
given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. . . .These appellants have
60. Id. at 444-45.
61. Id.
62. Id. In 1994 Congress created a pilot program providing for in forma pauperis bankruptcy
filing in six federal districts. Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting on and
Beyond United States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 57, 65 (1994) (discussing Kras, the law
after Kras, and the pilot program itself). However, despite the pilot programs, as the M.L.B. case
attests, Kras still appears to be good law.
63. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 446.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 446-50.
68. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
69. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660-61 (additionally finding no equal protection violation).
70. Id. at 659-60.
71. Id. at 659.
72. Id. at 660 (quoting Kras, 409 U.S. at 446).
73. Id.
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had hearings. "" While the Court clearly performed a fundamental/non-
fundamental rights analysis on the asserted right, it is unclear why the
Court did not directly discuss its ruling on substantive due process
grounds.
Through Kras and Ortwein, the Court attempted to further clarify
the types of interests that would rise to the level of fundamental and de-
serve protection in court access inquiries.'5 What was clear by the time
these cases were decided, however, was that extending Griffin to civil
court fee waivers was the exception, not the rule. 6
II. M.L.B. v. S.LJ.
M.L.B. v. S.LJ. is the most recent case in the Griffin line. It demon-
strates the indeterminate undertow of Fourteenth Amendment in forma
pauperis doctrine. M.L.B. is particularly useful because the Court itself
acknowledges the confusion and unclear doctrine in this area.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Melissa L. Brooks (M.L.B.) and Sammy Lee James (S.L.J.)" had
two children, were married for approximately eight years, and were di-
vorced in 1992."8 Upon their divorce, Mr. James retained custody of the
children and Ms. Brooks provided child support payments and retained
visitation rights." Three months after the divorce' Mr. James married
J.P.L., and together they filed suit to terminate Ms. Brooks's parental
rights so that J.P.L. could legally adopt the children." At the center of the
dispute was whether Ms. Brooks had fulfilled her child support and visi-
tation obligations. 2
On December 14, 1994, the chancery court terminated the parental
rights of Ms. Brooks, stating that there had been a "'substantial erosion
of the relationship between the natural mother, [M.L.B.], and the minor
74. Id.
75. It has been noted that, "[allthough it is not clear how significant the 'fundamental' nature
of the marriage relationship was for the Boddie Court, the Kras and Ortwein opinions confirmed the
view that access challenges would be unsuccessful unless a fundamental right was involved." Aus-
tin, supra note 25, at 770-71. This view may be confirmed by the M.L.B. case itself where the ma-
jority, noting what appears to be a fundamental rights standard in the area of court access fees in-
quiries, stated, "[wle place this case within the framework established by our past decisions in this
area.... [W]e inspect the character and intensity of the interest at stake, on the one hand, and the
State's justification for its exaction, on the other." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996).
76. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 563-64. ("In sum, as Ortwein underscored, this Court has not ex-
tended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases.").
77. See Savage, supra note 1, at 40.
78. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
79. Id.
80. Savage, supra note 1, at 40.




children."' 3 This erosion had been caused "'at least in part by [M.L.B.'s]
serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreason-
able failure to visit or communicate with her minor children."' The
chancery court determined that Mr. James and J.P.L. "met their burden
of proof by 'clear and convincing evidence.""
Approximately one year later, Ms. Brooks appealed the ruling. '
While she was granted the right to appeal by Mississippi law, she had to
prepay transcript costs amounting to $2,352.36 to fully avail herself of
that right. As she was too poor to afford these costs, Ms. Brooks applied
for an appeal informa pauperis.' The Supreme Court of Mississippi de-
nied her application on the basis that a fee waiver in civil court was only
available at the trial level. Unable to pay the fees, Ms. Brooks was effec-
tively denied an appeal." Subsequently, Ms. Brooks filed a writ of certio-
rari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted.'
B. Opinion for the Majority
The Court framed the issue presented by Ms. Brooks's appeal as
whether "a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment [may] condition appeals from trial
court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability
to pay record preparation fees."' In response, the majority placed Griffin
and its progeny at the heart of its opinion. Justice Ginsburg utilized the
Griffin line of cases as the analytical starting point for the majority
opinion.'
Carefully dissecting the line of in forma pauperis decisions, the
Court underscored the importance of availing to the poor the right to
court access in situations where a fundamental interest is at stake.93 In
contrast, the Court juxtaposed the line of cases dealing with the non-
fundamental right of an indigent to counsel in certain proceedings.9 ' The
Court pointed out that while its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright " man-
83. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion in terminating the parental rights of M.L.B.).
84. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion).
85. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion).




90. Savage, supra note 1, at 40.
91. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct at 559.
92. Id. at 560-61.
93. Id. at 560-62. Justice Ginsburg illustrated this point with the juxtaposition of Mayer v. City
of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1989), pointing out that even at lesser levels of criminal liability culpabil-
ity the liberty interest at stake is equally as important as the interest involved at at higher level of
criminal culpability in court access cases. Id. at 561-62.
94. Id. at 562.
95. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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dates that an indigent be granted counsel if charged with a felony, Scott
v. Illinois97 indicates that this is not the case where conviction would not
result in imprisonment." With respect to appeals, the Court noted that
under Douglas v. California' the state must provide counsel if the indi-
gent will have to serve prison time and is appealing as a matter of right,'"
yet under Ross v. Mofitt °' no such obligation exists in a discretionary
appeal. 2
Justice Ginsburg then made the jump to the civil court extensions of
the Griffin doctrine, subsequently detailing Boddie."'3 Ginsburg quickly
noted Kras and Ortwein, and declared the extension of Griffin to civil
cases as the exception, not the rule.'" Despite this cautionary approach,
Justice Ginsburg set the stage for the analysis that was to follow, stating
that the Court treats "state controls or intrusions on family relation-
ships"" at a different level, implying that Ms. Brooks's case may be on
the level of Boddie.'" Ginsburg noted the importance the Court placed on
"[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children.""In
The majority highlighted the importance of the parent-child relationship
by detailing the parental rights termination cases of Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services' and Santosky v. Kramer.'"
The Court then used a hybrid standard of due process and equal
protection analysis in its analysis of Ms. Brooks's predicament."' The
Court explained that
In the Court's Griffin-line cases, "[dlue process and equal protection
principles converge." The equal protection concern relates to the le-
gitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their in-
ability to pay core costs .... The due process concern homes [sic] in
96. M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 562 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339).
97. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
98. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74).
99. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
100. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct at 562 (citing Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357).
101. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
102. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 610,612,616-18).
103. Id. at 562.
104. Id. at 563-64.
105. Id. at 564.
106. Id. at 563-64.
107. Id. at 564.
108. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In Lassiter, the Court essentially underscored the fundamental nature
of the parental right by noting that a parent has a right to "'companionship, care, custody and man-
agement of his or her children."' Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972)).
109. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Court again highlighted the primary importance of
such rights. The Court determined that due to the importance of the parental right and the severity of
its termination, a high degree of proof, under whatever allegations, would have to be proven before a





on the essential fairness of the state-orders proceedings anterior to
adverse state action."'
Justice Ginsburg still noted that while no clear combination test had been
devised, the Griffin cases "res[t] on an equal protection framework.""'2
The Court would weigh the "character and intensity of the individual
interest at stake"' 3 against the "[sitate's justification for its exaction.'""4
In its analysis, the Court determined that Ms. Brooks's parental in-
terest was quite important considering the impact of Mississippi's intru-
sion upon that right: the termination of her parental rights."' In contrast,
Mississippi's interest in requiring the payment of fees was financial,
which the Court felt was not nearly as great as Ms. Brooks's interest,
comparing the situation to that in Mayer."6
Continuing to separate this situation out of the bundle of civil cases,
the Court framed the equal protection argument. "[Slanctions... like the
Mississippi prescription here... are not merely disproportionate in im-
pact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, .. . they
apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class.""' 7 The
majority overruled the Mississippi Supreme Court after characterizing
(1) the state intrusion into the private interest as severe, (2) Ms. Brooks's
parental interest as fundamental to liberty, and (3) the state financial in-
terest as minor in comparison."8
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy stated that due process alone, not the Griffin-
inspired due process/equal protection analysis upon which the majority
relied, was a "sufficient basis" for the decision.' 9 He justified his posi-
tion by relying on Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky. Kennedy stated that
these cases dealt with state intrusion into family rights and relations, and
were all decided on due process grounds.'"
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent'2'
Justice Thomas, while recognizing the importance of the interest
involved in Ms. Brooks's case, feared that the majority's rationale would
result in the unnecessary expansion of the fee waiver doctrine, further





116. Id. at 566-67.
117. Id. at 569.
118. Id. at 569-70.
119. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Justice Scalia joined in full and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Part I only.
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burdening the states.'22 He also stated that "[tihe cases on which the ma-
jority relies were questionable when decided, and have, in my view been
undermined since. Even accepting those cases, however, I am of the view
that the majority takes them too far."'" Justice Thomas criticized the
majority's hybrid due process/equal protection analysis for being mis-
guided and confused. Thomas stated that this confused approach war-




Thomas determined that due process was afforded to Ms. Brooks
through her original hearing and that the due process requirement did not
require an appeal of such a hearing.' In regard to the equal protection
issue, he determined that Ms. Brooks, while disproportionally affected by
the Mississippi law, was afforded equal protection. This was because the
law treated all individuals equally and her inability to pay only prevented
her from availing herself of process that was "above and beyond" what
the Constitution demanded.
26
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Thomas declared that he would go
as far as overruling the Griffin line of cases, including Griffin itself."
Justice Thomas drew a sharp distinction between criminal and civil ac-
tions, arguing that the line of cases succeeding Griffin extended the fee
waiver principle to interests never contemplated by the Griffin Court. It
appears that Justice Thomas felt that a clear line could never be drawn
limiting the Griffin holding, as the lines between the criminal and civil
arenas are often unclear.' 28 As he stated, "I fear that the growth of Griffin
in the criminal area may be mirrored in the civil area."'"
111. ANALYSIS
Beginning with a theoretical exposition into reasons for the inherent
problems in the in forma pauperis doctrine, this analysis sets out three
premises. First, a heightened degree of doctrinal confusion exists in the
Court's in forma pauperis decisions. Second, this doctrinal indetermi-
nacy facilitates a judge's ability to justify any desired outcome. Third, as
such, current in forma pauperis doctrine, arguably designed to protect
indigents, could be used to deny that protection. Working from the un-
derstanding of this three-tiered problem, this analysis ultimately arrives
at a solution, a new equal protection test specifically designed for in
forma pauperis situations.
122. M.L.B., 117. Ct. at570.
123. Id. at 571.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 572.
126. Id. at 574-75.
127. Id. at 575.
128. Id. at 576-77.
129. id. at 577.
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A. Ms. Brooks's Court Access: What Doctrine?
In his M.L.B. dissent, Justice Thomas presented a valid and striking
point. The state of analysis in the majority's opinion is, to put it bluntly,
confused.'3° Justice Ginsburg herself drew attention to this jumbled
analysis, noting that while decisions in the informa pauperis area rest on
an equal protection framework, they also address due process concerns.'3'
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg admitted that "[a] 'precise rationale' has not
been composed . . . because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by
resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.""32 This rationalization
seems to be the best explanation the Court can present to explain the
unkempt doctrinal mess that is informa pauperis.
One can see from the doctrinal history the vivid inconsistency of the
Griffin line. Sometimes cases were decided on due process grounds (both
substantive and procedural), sometimes equal protection, and sometimes
both.'33 The test that the Court uses to analyze in forma pauperis is jum-
bled and unclear. One only has to look to Justice Kennedy's M.L.B. con-
currence to confirm the Court's confusion in this area. He treats due pro-
cess alone as the correct justification for the holding in the case, rather
than the majority's hybrid analysis.'34
While the M.L.B. majority certainly felt that it ruled justly by pro-
tecting a fundamentally important interest,'33 one cannot precisely deter-
mine how the majority reached that result. Such decisions only serve to
further confuse the concept of fundamental rights and the question of
130. See id. at 570-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued:
[C]arrying forward the ambiguity in the cases on which it relies, the majority does not
specify the source of relief it grants .... And while we are told that cases of this order
"cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis," the majority
nonetheless acknowledges that "most decisions in this area ... res[t] on an equal protec-
tion framework." It then purports to "place this case within the framework established by
our past decisions in this area." It is not clear to me whether the majority disavows any
due process support for its holding. (Despite the murky disclaimer, the majority discusses
numerous cases which squarely relied on due process considerations.)
Id. at 571 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666, 665 (1983)).
131. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
132. M.L.B., 117S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) and Bearden,
461 U.S. at 666, respectively).
133. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
134. M.L.B., 117S. Ct.at570.
135. The majority stated:
[W]e have repeatedly noticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from mine
run civil actions .... To recapitulate, termination decrees "wor[k] a unique kind of depriva-
tion." In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances,
termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State "to destroy permanently
all legal recognition of the parental relationship."
Id. at 569-70 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), and Rivera v.
Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987), respectively).
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how those rights interplay with due process, equal protection, and the
Fourteenth Amendment in right to court access situations.'36
B. Problems in the Current State of In Forma Pauperis Analysis
In M.L.B., the right to proceed informa pauperis flows into the fun-
damental right of parenthood. This confluence brings the Court's analy-
sis into the area of overlap between substantive due process and equal
protection at the fundamental rights level. '37 As the Court duly notes,
"'[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge"""8 in Griffin-
line cases.'39
M.L.B. follows the typical in forma pauperis pattern. The unequal
treatment resulting from the court fee statute immediately implicates
equal protection concerns.' The denial of process brings into question
procedural due process.' The parental rights well up substantive due
process concerns yet at the same time permeate the heightened scrutiny
level of equal protection. True to form, due to this overlap the Court is
indecisive about which method of analysis to pursue.
What initially seems to be a quite innocuous confluence of two pre-
viously declared rights becomes something greater. M.L.B. stands as a
red flag. Informa pauperis doctrine, in conjunction with the protection it
affords indigents, is dangerously close to being pulled into the chaotic
undertow of politically motivated judicial decision making spawned by
indeterminate doctrine.
In informa pauperis analysis the doctrinal confusion itself is not the
entire problem. This confusion expands the avenues judges can follow in
their analyses. The right to proceed informa pauperis is sometimes a due
process issue, sometimes equal protection, and sometimes both. 2 In re-
ality, any combination or choice of these doctrinal analysis strands ef-
fectively leads to a justifiable solution, any justifiable solution. A dem-
onstration with the M.L.B. situation elucidates these possibilities.
136. See Austin, supra note 25. The article by Austin is a good analysis of this state of confu-
sion. As a solution to such confusion, Austin proposes a procedural due process method of analysis
based upon Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 371 (1971). Austin, supra note 25, at 779-80. See gener-
ally Fallon, supra note 34 (underscoring the state of confusion that exists in the totality of due proc-
ess doctrine and the problems that this confusion presents). Two of the problems that Fallon dis-
cusses go straight to the heart of the problems that crop up in M.L.B.: confusion in what substantive
due process doctrine tests to use and their application and what interests are protected by the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 312-13, 314-37.
137. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
138. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
139. Id. at 565.
140. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
141. See Austin, supra note 25, at 773. Austin's article presents the argument that the proce-
dural due process model, while not the predominant model in analyzing court access fee cases, is a
better method than substantive due process at solving the access fee problem. See id. at 779-803.
142. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
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1. Holding for Ms. Brooks
A Justice could argue that Ms. Brooks's procedural due process
rights were denied; that she should have had an appeal hearing.' 3 As the
Court pointed out in Lassiter, Santosky, and M.L.B., fundamental human
nature encompasses the parent-child bond. This fundamentally human
relationship is congruent with the factors defining the liberty interests
previously protected by the Court through procedural due process.'"
Thus, the parent-child bond should be accorded a high level of proce-
dural protection. The state's fee requirement, as demonstrated by Ms.
Brooks's situation, carried an undue amount of risk that such rights
would erroneously be taken away. The result of the fee law in effect was
the final, point-of-no-return removal of Ms. Brooks's parental right. Fi-
nally, the state's interest in efficiency is quite minor and unimportant in
the face of the results, the termination of Ms. Brooks's parental rights.
A Justice could additionally argue that Ms. Brooks's substantive
due process rights were denied.'"" The primacy of the parent-child rela-
tionship again underscores the fundamental importance of such a familial
bond. Contrasting this fundamental importance with the similar under-
lying human importance of other rights of association already deemed
fundamental, a clear fundamental right to parenthood arises. Next, com-
pelling state interest analysis ensues. The fundamental parental right in-
volved trumps the state efficiency right.'"
Finally, a Justice can find for Ms. Brooks under equal protection
theory.' 7 Once the Justice establishes the fundamental right of parent-
hood, circumventing the need for suspect class status, the last step is the
same state interest inquiry made under substantive due process.
2. Holding for the State
Under procedural due process analysis, a Justice could validly hold
in favor of the State.'" The Justice could reason the parental interest at
the appeal stage as less important than it is at the stage of the initial
hearing. At the initial hearing, where the termination of parental rights
occurred, the specific private interest itself clashed with government pro-
cess. At the appeal stage, however, the private interest is the right to ap-
peal. The justification for the state is efficiency and fiscal health. The law
143. See supra note 14 for the Mathews procedural due process test applied in this scenario.
144, The Court has noted that "[liberty) denotes.. . the right of the individual to... establish a
home and bring up children." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
145. See supra notes 15-19 for the substantive due process test applied in this scenario.
146. The argument presented here is much like that of Justice Kennedy in his M.L.B. concur-
rence. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; see also M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
147. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text for the equal protection test applied in this
scenario.
148. See supra note 14 for the Mathews procedural due process test applied in this scenario.
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facilitating this interest does exactly that, regulating entry into the courts,
and thus contributes to a more efficient court docket. Given the non-
fundamental nature of the right to appeal, the state's efficiency and eco-
nomic interests take precedence.
Under substantive due process, 1 9 a Justice could argue that parental
rights, while highly important, are not the rights at issue in this in forma
pauperis situation. The right in question is, rather, a free appeal in a civil
case. No fundamental right to appeal exists in civil cases. If no such right
exists, no fundamental right to a free appeal exists. This determination
brings the analysis under the rational relation test. Regulation of court
access falls under how a state regulates its own welfare. ° Thus, the
state's right to regulate its own courts trumps the individual's right to
court access. The statute attempts to place a limit on access to the appel-
late process through a monetary requirement. The results of such a re-
striction naturally further the legitimate constitutional power to regulate
state welfare.''
Finally, a Justice could validly advocate resolution for the state un-
der equal protection. "2 The Justice would essentially reiterate the sub-
stantive due process argument that no fundamental right is at issue. The
right implicated is, rather, the non-fundamental right to proceed in forma
pauperis in a civil appeal. The absence of a fundamental right reduces
the analysis to looking for a suspect classification by the statute. The
Court does not find classification based on wealth to be suspect. Again,
the court fee statute rationally relates to the state's efficiency and fiscal
policy interests.'
3. The Problem Stated
The method a Justice uses to resolve a particular in forma pauperis
case develops somewhat independently from the constitutional test she
chooses to apply. The doctrine as it stands does not sufficiently constrain
judicial discretion. The doctrine itself is not the determinative factor. The
determining factor in the end emanates from what right the Justice seeks
149. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text for the substantive due process test applied
in this scenario.
150. State court fees logically fit within the large police power of the state. The broad deference
to the state at this rational relation level is rooted within the infamous footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
151. This argument is similar to that of Justice Thomas in the substantive due process part of
his M.L.B. dissent. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; see also M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at
570-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text for the equal protection test applied in this
scenario.
153. This argument is similar to that of Justice Thomas in the equal protection part of his




to protect-the individual's or the state's. The differing opinions in
M.L.B. underscore this indeterminate reality. As Justice Ginsburg stated:
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children
are among associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic im-
portance in our society," rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disre-
spect ... M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever per-
manently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the
Court has long required to when a family association so undeniably
important is at stake.1
54
Justice Thomas, however, used the same constitutional tests as the
majority to establish a right on behalf of the state, which he deemed more
important than any individual right to civil appeal. "The inevitable con-
sequence will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance
to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests
that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distin-
guished from the admittedly important interest at issue here.""'
In the final assessment, the constitutional "test" used in in forma
pauperis situations becomes a subjective means to an end, merely a tool.
The fungability of in forma pauperis doctrine poses the true problem.
Identifying doctrinal problems is, however, relatively easy. The follow-
ing pages address the more difficult endeavor of effectively solving these
problems.
Logic dictates that a more determinate doctrine would guarantee
more consistent results. Thus, a viable solution to the in forma pauperis
problem is the construction of an objective analytical structure around
the applicable clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A purely objective
superstructure of analysis will curtail the ability of a Justice to substitute
her own beliefs for constitutional analysis. While focussing on objectiv-
ity, a new and effective informa pauperis test must also capture the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protection from undue state regulation."6
Such is the paradoxical challenge that the next section of this Comment
confronts.
154. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
155. Id. at570-71.
156. Drawing on this Comment's background, it is evident that the Fourteenth Amendment,
from its Magna Carta roots forward, protects the individual from the unjustified oppressive intrusion
of the state. Protecting the poor from some arbitrary court affordability cut-off flows with the famil-
iar goals of justice. Thus, in this manner it seems that the Court's current conception of in forma
pauperis flows with the driving spirit at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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C. Doctrine and Indeterminacy
Critical and Feminist Legal scholars argue that doctrine is extremely
subject to manipulation."' The critique that these scholars present, dem-
onstrated by the inexactness of in forma pauperis doctrine,' is often
described as the indeterminacy of law and doctrine.'59 The argument fol-
lows that a judge will unconsciously manipulate a doctrine in order to
arrive at the outcome she wishes. Consequently, any doctrine or law can
be manipulated by a judge to justify her determination in a case." In
addition, many of these theorists argue that, under what is commonly
called the critique of rights, any particular stance by a judge can be justi-
fied by a rights-based argument.'6'
The pure law and indeterminacy critique seems to suggest that one
doctrine is just as bad as multiple doctrines because any singular doctrine
suffers from indeterminacy. From a more pragmatic view, limiting a par-
ticular area of the law to just one doctrine does control some of the inde-
terminacy problem. The more varied the strands of doctrine in a particu-
lar area of the law, the more room and opportunity a judge has to be
subjective and make more rights-based arguments for an individual or
the state.
Thus, a judge faced with such a muddled area of the law as in forma
pauperis will have multiple avenues to make a rights-based argument for
157. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978) (demonstrating how a
rather radical law, one that was seen originally as championing the rights of powerless workers, was
indeterminate in a "doctrinal sense," and eventually was used by courts as a device to constrain the
limits of workers' bargaining power); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Fam-
ily, 18 MicH. J.L. REFoRM 835 (1985) (demonstrating the Critique of Rights in showing how a
perfectly valid rights-based argument could be made for any sort of state action or non-action in
domestic relations cases, either for or against state intervention, and that the idea of intervention
itself is indeterminate).
158. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
159. J. Paul Oetken, Form and Substance in Critical Legal Studies, 100 YALE L.J. 2209, 2211
(1991). The indeterminacy of law and doctrine was first discussed and presented formally by the
legal realists of the early twentieth century. See generally John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From
Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy
Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 86-98 (1995) (delineating the history of the indeterminacy argument
from the legal realists through the process theorists towards the critical legal theorists).
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is a far-reaching and non-homogenous body of thought. Critical
Legal Scholars differ across the spectrum in their approach to and degree of extremity in the appli-
cation of indeterminacy doctrine. For a better understanding of this universe of opinion and a thor-
ough listing of works on the foundations of CLS, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliog-
raphy of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
160. See Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMi L.
REV. 505, 513-16 (1987) (describing the nuances of a sample indeterminacy of law and doctrine
argument).
161. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 593-97 (1986) (giving an in-depth formulation of all
aspects of the critique of rights).
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the indigent individual ("private" liberty rights) or for the State ("public"
court efficiency rights). This indeterminacy allows for many different
lines of justification to evolve, often contradicting each other though they
are rooted in the same doctrinal tree.
The following exercise in mathematical metaphor demonstrates this
Comment's understanding and approach to the indeterminacy critique.'62
Many proponents of the more extreme vision of doctrine and indetermi-
nacy believe that the problem lies within the existence of doctrine it-
self.'" For these advocates, any doctrine, no matter what its original in-
tention or prudent and descriptive wording, will be used by judges to
conform to any particular decision.' " Any doctrine in this extreme vision
can be symbolized by - (infinity), meaning that the doctrine has an infi-
nite realm of possible results. Infinity, simply put, encompasses every-
thing." This wholly "infinite" indeterminate aspect of doctrine thus be-
comes the inherent problem of doctrine."
The radical vision of doctrine and indeterminacy becomes quite
cumbersome when it comes time to construct a solution that results in a
more consistent application.'67 A slight variation of the metaphor presents
162. In a broader sense, the implications of mathematics on the indeterminacy argument have
been previously discussed within the scope of legal scholarship. The context of such discussion
focuses on the applicability of particular mathematical theories and proofs to potential indeterminacy
of language. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1441
(1992). Brown and Greenberg ponder the avenues for obtaining a viable legal formalism through
mathematical inference. See generally id. (comparing formalism in both the legal and mathematical
communities and their corresponding indeterminacy).
163. See infra notes 166-67.
164. Id.
165. "The symbol '-,' represents a limitless quantity." BARRON'S DICIONARY OF
MATHEMATICS TERMS 167 (Douglas Downing ed., 2d ed. 1995).
166. The radical indeterminacy argument can be drawn out to absurd lengths. Taken to ex-
tremes, everything, anywhere in the universe, is entirely indeterminate because it can only be de-
fined relative to something else. That "something else" itself must be defined before it can be used in
relation to the original object, color, shape, etc., for definitional purposes. In torn, the "something
else" is defined in relation to another "something else," and so on, and so on ad nauseum. So every
term a judge uses in analysis is in the purest sense indeterminate. However, this Comment, as dis-
cussed in the proceeding text and footnotes, works from an understanding that some terms can be
defined with sufficient determinacy if placed in a quantifiable matrix. There is precedent for such
thinking. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82
CAL. L. REv. 509, 522-27. "One should not exaggerate the problem. If vagueness is generally in-
eliminable, it does not follow that it is irreducible in a given area, or with respect to a given speech
community. The most successful endeavors in this regard have involved the comparativization and
the quantification of descriptions." Id. at 525.
167. Guyora Binder articulates this position, noting that
If critical legal studies is to have a meaningful effect on an oppressive cultural system, it
must move beyond criticism. It must begin to imagine and build social situations that of-
fer people empowered identities. And if critical legal scholars hope to influence their stu-
dents, they must start thinking about how these situations ... can be fostered by lawyers.
Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. C. L. REV. 888, 889-90 (1988). Binder sternly criticizes
the futility of radical critical legal studies and poses a practical solution of political action. Id. at 905-
14. Binder's solution is a direct response to the frustrating and unending circularity of the radical
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a more optimistic approach and, in the end, a more practical solution.
One must first admit that at its heart, doctrine is indeterminate. No matter
how much one fine-tunes a doctrine there still will be some potential for
subjective analysis by any particular judge. Yet, at the same time, if a
doctrine can be constructed in a well-defined manner, objective and
quantifiable in material terms, it minimizes the impact of indeterminacy.
In the mathematical metaphor, as per this adjustment in theory and
understanding, substitute n (pi) for - for a particular doctrine. T, the ex-
act ratio of the circumference to the diameter of any circle, is very well
defined.'" This ratio is the same for any circle in the universe. 9 Despite
the precise, well-defined, and consistent nature of t, the ratio itself is
indeterminate. ic is an irrational number, a number which has no last
digit; the decimal places carry out forever.'70 Despite this indeterminacy,
the ratio remains quite clear and definable, as the indeterminacy becomes
less drastic with the calculation of more decimal places. In very much the
same way, a highly defined doctrine, based on easily quantifiable objec-
tive criteria that are exact (not abstract ideas such as fundamental rights,
class status, etc.), can minimize the impact of subjective judicial inter-
pretation. Under this approach indeterminacy becomes manageable.'7'
critical legal studies conundrum. Hasnas presents the problem succinctly: "If by showing the law to
be indeterminate ... [Critical Legal Studies has] ... shown it to be an inherently political mecha-
nism by which dominant social groups illegitimately impose their ideological preferences upon
society, how can [Critical Legal Studies] advocate its use to produce the egalitarian society [CLS
theorists] favor?" Hasnas, supra note 159, at 101.
168. DAVID WELLS, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF CURIOUS AND INTERESTING NUMBERS 48
(1987). Selecting n as a metaphor is not an arbitrary decision. it permeates the world that we live in
and holds a special place in mathematics. As Wells notes and demonstrates, the value of t crops up
in numerous mathematical solutions and the sums of numerous infinite series. Id. at 53. Simply put,
think of the beauty in a naturally occurring ratio, a ratio in an object that is real, observable, and
tangible, that is the same everywhere, that recurs throughout mathematics, that yet at the same time
has no exact value.
169. Id. at48.
170. An irrational number is "any real number that is not rational, and therefore any number
that cannot be written as a decimal that either terminates or repeats." Id. at 12.
171. Using a highly precise metaphor such as it might imply, on the surface at least, that law is
a science. The use of this analogy is not meant to imply that law is scientific and ultimately defin-
able. Obviously there are no absolute truths that can be distilled from the vast laboratory of judicial
opinions. It is precisely the critique of Critical Legal Studies (and legal realism before it) that such
truths do not exist. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text. The n metaphor implies a solu-
tion that works within the Critical Legal Studies matrix (the less radical version of the theory, more
along the lines of pragmatic Critical Race Theory or Feminist Legal Theory). The iT metaphor ac-
cepts the basic Critical Legal Studies critique of doctrinal indeterminacy. Yet, within that indetermi-
nacy the metaphor explores the possibilities for consistency of analysis. The metaphor thus becomes
a tool to show that law, while indeterminate and not necessarily scientific per se, can be consistent
and not arbitrary.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
D. Material Equal Protection
In forma pauperis analysis inevitably deals with concerns that im-
plicate equal protection. At the heart of all in forma pauperis situations is
an individual who is denied access to the courts when others are able to
gain such access. The law treats at least one person differently from the
larger societal group. As previously noted, the current equal protection
matrix poses a problem in that indigent individuals fighting for free ac-
cess to the courts do not comprise a suspect or semi-suspect class."
Without such status they must argue some fundamental rights violation
and face the indeterminate doctrine of that arena.
Any new structure of analysis must recognize and address the equal
protection nature of an in forma pauperis analysis and its overlap with
substantive due process at the fundamental rights level. A new test for in
forma pauperis analysis must incorporate equal protection and funda-
mental rights analysis in a single, separate, determinative test. The new
test must clarify and define rights through objective manifestations, not
through indeterminate terminology.
While it is true that "the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill,' 7 the language of the Equal
Protection Clause itself provides judicial remedy for in forma pauperis
situations. The Equal Protection Clause reads, "[n]o state shall ... deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""'
These words themselves are ample building material for a new constitu-
tional test that avoids the pitfalls that plague current in forma pauperis
analysis. The best way to gain an understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause for the purposes of in forma pauperis is to look at what charac-
terizes the Court's results in such cases.
In characterizing the results of in forma pauperis cases, a scholar
noted that
the conventional wisdom is that these cases can be reduced to two
propositions: first, waiver of access fees is required only if the right
sought to be enforced through the courts is fundamental, and second,
that waiver is required only when the courts provide the sole means
of vindicating that right.'76
172. See Austin, supra note 25, at 773-74. In reality the true root of the in forma pauperis
problem is the fact that the Court does not see classification based upon wealth as suspect. If the
Court did recognize such classification as suspect, an indigent seeking in forma pauperis status
would have no need to demonstrate a fundamental rights violation. With the absence of a funda-
mental rights discussion, the overlap between due process and equal protection would be moot.
Regardless, this Comment does not take issue with the Court's current construction of suspect class
status. Such discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
173. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
174. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973).
175. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. Austin, supra note 25, at 770.
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The Court, discussing its previous protection of individuals from
wealth-based discrimination, noted that "[t]he individuals... who con-
stituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two dis-
tinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were com-
pletely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.""
In moving towards determinacy, the key to utilizing these charac-
terizations is removing the rights-based analysis (the root of the current
problems of indeterminacy) from consideration while still retaining the
Court's intention. Keeping this goal in mind, we turn to an interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause, informed at the most fundamental level
by the desired results of the Court.
The first key phrase in the Equal Protection Clause is "any person."
This phrase does not imply any need to prove suspect classification to
invoke such protection. Under these words the state need only deny one
specific individual the protections of the law. The other key phrase is
"equal protection of the laws." Simply interpreted, this means that all
individuals should be treated equally under the law. While at certain
times some legal avenues may be open to some and not others, a viola-
tion of "equal protection of the laws" encompasses a situation where a
law actually takes away all protection. Additionally, nowhere does the
Amendment provision discuss state interests. In light of these considera-
tions, this Comment creates a solution to the informa pauperis dilemma:
material equal protection. '
In its construction, material equal protection analysis takes direct
guidance from the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet at the
same time eradicates the problems currently present in the muddled doc-
trine of in forma pauperis.9 Material equal protection focuses on the
material effect of a statute on the individual seeking relief. In this con-
text, a material effect could also be described as a substantive or objec-
tive effect. The material effect is the taking away of the only recourse
available to the individual to get out of the differential treatment situa-
tion. In this situation of differential treatment, the only remedy available
is one which only the court can grant.
177. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,20(1973).
178. The solution and test presented in this article are designed only for use in in forma pau-
peris situations. However, there may very well be applications of such a solution outside the area of
informa pauperis in other equal protection cases.
179. Material equal protection was inspired by proposals for reforming equal protection analy-
sis in the area of maternity leave. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986). Both Finley and MacKinnon
discuss methods of transcending the inherent male standards that women must compare themselves
to in order to gain either equal or special protection for maternity leave.
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Under material equal protection, a petitioning party will receive
protection by the court if she was denied the material legal protection
afforded to others. Class status and indeterminate fundamental rights
would never be discussed as they are incorporated into the material as-
pect of the analysis.'" In essence, this method focuses on any material
differences that the law creates. In the final calculation, the material
equal protection assessment of materiality is accomplished through two
yes/no questions: (1) Is the court access that the individual seeks access
that any other in society can gain under the statute?; (2) Does that indi-
vidual have any other recourse whatsoever to resolve his or her situation
other than the remedy that the court can grant?"' Under this test a yes
answer to the first question and a no answer in the second invoke equal
protection.
This two-pronged test effectively blocks the openings for indeter-
minate judicial decision-making. Both questions require a judge to make
an objective determination.'" The first question fixes its operation around
the words "any others." For example, if a statute states that an individual
must pay $2000 to gain an appeal it is obvious that some individuals will
be able to pay such fees. The answer to the first question is yes, others
can gain court access under the statute. Most of the time this answer will
be yes. In the interests of docket efficiency, these statutes are written
with the expectation that some people can pay, while others cannot. As
court access is commonly understood as bringing a grievance before the
court, the first question effectively limits the subjective determination
that a judge can make. The second question then becomes the key aspect
of the material equal protection test.
With respect to both questions in the material equal protection test,
the words themselves highly define and guide the decision-making proc-
ess. These words have common understandings and are placed into a
controlled environment: the construction of the test itself. The precise
and objective nature of the language makes a Justice look quite unrea-
sonable when she says something does not exist when it really does. In
other words, when a test forces a Justice to look for court access that
"any others" have and "any other recourse whatsoever," the analysis is
reduced to looking for factors that are objectively quantifiable.
The concern might be raised that material equal protection is too
narrowly constructed to adapt to changes over time. It is true that the
180. See infra Part III.E.
181. Of course, for any such recourse to be valid it must also be lawful.
182. It may be argued that despite its attempts at objectivity, material equal protection fails at
the gate in its use of terms. It is true, as the author has recognized, that all words are indeterminate in
exact meaning. This allegation could be made at the words "access" and "recourse," words that are
fundamental in the implementation of material equal protection. Yet, as already discussed, there are
some terms that do have some common understanding attached to them, some aspect of determinacy
that guides their usage. "Access" and "recourse" are two such words. See supra note 166.
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method of material equal protection analysis is constructed narrowly.
This construction creates consistency in analysis and results. The scope
of the analysis and the results, however, are quite broad. The material
equal protection test allows for adaptation as it has no prescription on
particular quantities, class status, levels of scrutiny, or protected rights.
The material effects of different laws may vary over time, yet the ramifi-
cations of that differential treatment remains a constant. The methods of
assessment are the same yes/no questions and the results are the same
type of results; the only difference being different situations, rights, and
issues.
An intriguing aspect of material equal protection is how the test
protects individual fundamental rights without mentioning them. As pre-
viously presented in this Comment, a practical critique of rights analysis
draws out the fundamental indeterminacy problem with current informa
pauperis doctrine.' 3 With the many avenues of resolution available to a
Justice, all dealing in some manner with a rights-based inquiry, a Justice
can validly justify a decision for the individual or the state. While the
Equal Protection Clause is often seen as protecting individual rights, by
actually bringing rights into the debate the door opens for the denial of
such rights. The best way to protect individual rights is to take the rights-
based decision away from the judge.
While never dealing with individual rights in a judicially determi-
native sense, material equal protection is inherently informed by the fact
circumstances attendant to such rights. Racial, ethnic, sexual orientation,
religious, and gender discrimination are often the bases for differential
treatment by laws. As these discriminatory implications inform the par-
ticular differential treatment under a law, a Justice answering yes to the
first question and no to the second implicitly upholds the rights that were
violated in the statute's operation, thus validating those individual rights.
Under this approach, a Justice who would rather not uphold certain indi-
vidual rights has no choice but to do so in the appropriate circumstances,
based upon the material and objective nature of the two yes/no material
equal protection questions.
Material equal protection, in sum, fits the model of the mathemati-
cal ratio of n. Material equal protection analysis is well-defined and
based on easily quantifiable, objective determinations, in the same man-
ner as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter. Indeterminacy
still exists in the sense that the judge will make the ultimate decision, as
the n ratio is also indeterminate. The quantitative observations the judge
must make, however, minimize that indeterminacy.
It is important to note how material equal protection parallels the
Court's previous results, yet implements those results in a more determi-
183. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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nate and objective manner. At a deeper level the emphasis on funda-
mental rights translates such that the more severe the threat to a funda-
mental right (such as in criminal convictions, parental terminations, etc.),
the less the possibility that there will exist some other recourse for the
individual to resolve the situation. As detailed previously, fundamental
rights are incorporated into material equal protection but in a more de-
terminate manner. A demonstration of this parallel relationship is pre-
sented in the next section: an application of material equal protection to
the Griffin line of informa pauperis cases.
E. Applying Material Equal Protection to In Forma Pauperis
This Comment does not disagree with the Court's holdings in the
Griffin line. It should be clear, however, that future decisions may retract
this line of protections. In response, material equal protection promises
consistent results in which judges cannot decide cases based upon politi-
cal leanings. The following section demonstrates the consistent applica-
bility of material equal protection to the Griffin line, including M.L.B.
The application of material equal protection to Ms. Brooks's situa-
tion results in the same outcome reached by the Court. The first question
in the analysis, whether the court access sought is available to at least
one individual in society is answered with a resounding yes. Quite obvi-
ously, at least one individual could pay the transcript costs. The second
inquiry, whether the individual has any other recourse whatsoever to
resolve her situation other than the remedy that the court can grant, is
answered with a definitive no. Ms. Brooks's attempt to re-obtain her
parental rights absolutely requires an appeal. The material result of the
Mississippi law is that Ms. Brooks has no method of appealing the pa-
rental rights termination while others faced with the same legal situation
could afford the court costs. No method other than a court determination
can alleviate the differential treatment. She will thus be able to proceed
informa pauperis. In material equal protection terminology, the law sub-
stantively treats her differently and materially affects her differently than
other citizens.
Under material equal protection the civil court limitations on the
Griffin line stand. In Kras,'" while others could gain the desired court
access under the statute (by paying the filing fee), other recourses to dis-
solve debt are available. This denial of bankruptcy proceedings does not
violate material equal protection because there is no material effect cre-
ated by such a law. As the Kras Court noted, many methods exist for a
debtor to resolve his debts, only one of which is filing for bankruptcy.'"
184. For a description of the case, see supra notes 58-67.
185. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973). There is evidence in the Kras decision
itself for the compatibility of material equality with the Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated
that, "[Kras's] position [would] not be materially altered in any constitutional sense." hL (emphasis
added).
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The law itself does not deny an individual the ability to resolve debt,
which is the material aspect of bankruptcy. In contrast, Ms. Brooks is
differentially affected in a material manner because she has no method
whatsoever to appeal the termination of her parental rights when others
can utilize that method as they can afford the costs.
Additionally, in Ortwein," material equal protection upholds the
law mandating filing fees for welfare appeals. Some individuals on wel-
fare will probably be able to pay for a welfare appeal filing fee, so the
answer to the first inquiry is yes. However, with respect to "any. other
recourse whatsoever," arguably other recourses do exist for these indi-
viduals to alleviate their impoverished situation, such as receiving private
charity or obtaining employment.' Thus the situation is similar to Kras,
in that other recourses exist for the individuals seeking relief. The answer
to the second question in turn is yes. Invocation of equal protection does
not occur. This result may seem anti-intuitive at first glance. The poor in
this situation however are not differentially treated in any material matter
as per material equal protection analysis. Simply put, this law does not
discriminate on the basis of wealth. While informa pauperis is designed
to protect the poor from having poverty itself be used as an obstacle to
the ultimate fair distribution of justice and treatment of rights, such pro-
tection is not invoked by the Ortwein fact pattern. In Ortwein, the law in
question deals obstensively with poverty itself. Such a law does not vio-
late equal protection. In contrast, a law violative of material equal pro-
tection discriminates on the basis of poverty.
Under material equal protection the holdings of the other major
cases in the Griffin line are also consistent. The Griffin and Mayer cases
both elicit the same results. Again, in response to the first question under
material equal protection, other people could pay the required court tran-
script fees and gain court access in a situation where the appellants could
not. No other recourse whatsoever exists for the Griffin and Mayer appli-
cants as their criminal convictions can only be overturned through an
appeal granted by the court." Both -cases, therefore, invoke equal protec-
tion. The Boddie case follows in kind."9 As the appellants have no other
way to legally end their marriage and others in society could afford to
legally end their own marriages, equal protection is invoked under the
two-question material equal protection test.
186. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
187. While this stance may be controversial, welfare is no longer an entitlement, nor an abso-
lute right. In essence, welfare is a safety net that is not the only method of fiscal recovery for the
individual. Compare welfare to the parental rights scenario in which no individual or body can grant
or terminate parental rights other than the court. See Personal Responsiblity and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 103, 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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Material equal protection circumvents the discussion of suspect or
semi-suspect classifications, which represents a large stumbling block for
indigents in equal protection analysis. Rational or compelling state inter-
ests are never at issue. Additionally, and most importantly in cases such
as Ms. Brooks's, fundamental rights are involved only indirectly and in a
much more objective and determinate analysis structure." While mate-
rial equal protection disregards these considerations, its results are ex-
actly the same as the Griffin line decisions. Material equal protection
thus avoids the indeterminate pitfalls of current in forma pauperis analy-
sis while retaining the desired results embodied in the Griffin line. This
replacement analysis effectively reduces the indeterminacy in the doc-
trine to a controllable, manageable level. Without any meaningful level
of indeterminacy, Justices will not be able to abuse the doctrine set up to
protect indigents to the point to actually revoke such protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
M.L.B. undoubtedly was a victory for parental and individual fun-
damental rights. This victory must not, however, obscure the problems
that the M.L.B. decision portends for the future. The confused and inde-
terminate doctrine upon which the decision rests will eventually turn on
itself, each resulting strand of doctrine ending up on different sides of
future opinions. There is too much room at present for a Justice to ma-
190. Interestingly enough, as a sidelight, material equal protection brings the debate back to the
side argument of whether or not the court should follow an originalist interpretive pattern in assess-
ing the Constitution and its amendments. In fact, material equal protection poses a possibility for
harmonization of the originalist and non-originalist positions.
As is clear from the background of this Comment, a primarily fundamental rights non-
originalist approach has brought the doctrine this far to its climax in confusion. See supra notes 15-
16 and accompanying text. For some time, originalists, among them Justice Scalia, have been argu-
ing that such focus is incoherent, deviates from original constitutional intentions, and places too
much judge subjectivity in place of the constitution itself. Anders, supra note 16, at 904-05. Yet, at
present there exists no real originalist solution except to exercise judicial restraint, invalidate current
unenumerated fundamental rights, and frame constitutional interpretation in an original inteItion
framework. See id. at 903-12 (detailing Justice Scalia's originalist approach to constitutional analy-
sis).
Critical Legal Studies, the basic radical legal theory that is the impetus for much of the
author's vision, is looked upon by the mainstream legal community as something of a fringe rebel
group, described as "dangerous, potentially violent, and on at least one occasion as a form of 'guer-
rilla warfare."' Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.J. 1, 1
(1987) (quoting Critical Legal Times at Harvard, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87). Material equal pro-
tection creates no unenumerated rights, no suspect classes, and in the end works rather closely with
only the words given in the Fourteenth Amendment. The goals and roots of material equal protection
are rather progressive, yet the means by which these goals are achieved end up in a much more
conservative looking package. By no means is this idea alone in its basic approach. In a rather par-
allel way Professor Nancy Ehrenreich proposes embracing privatization as a means of implementing
progressive forms as privatization is a means "to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's
house." Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1235,
1238 (1996). Ehrenreich turns the logic of Audre Lorde's famous quote, "[t]he master's tools will
never dismantle the master's house" upon itself. See Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUrSIDER 112 (1984).
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nipulate a particular strand of doctrine to further a political agenda. The
very doctrine protecting the indigent inevitably will deny the indigent
protection from the oppressive monetary constraints of court access.
Recognizing such problems, yet realizing the possibility for a more
determinate solution, the Court must clarify in forma pauperis analysis.
Doctrinal application can be consistent, yet manageably indeterminate at
the same time. The common understanding of the determi-
nacy/indeterminacy quandary must move away from a futile critique and,
instead, reflect reality. The time has come, therefore, to envision doctrine
in the mathematical model of ir, not oo. Material equal protection, a clear
and objective means of analysis, achieves this goal. It also retains the
Court's important limitations on informa pauperis. While the indetermi-
nacy inherent in doctrine can never be fully eradicated, a solution based
upon easily quantifiable and objective factors minimizes the effects of
indeterminacy. Material equal protection enables the Court to limit sub-
jective judicial bias and move toward an objective standard of in forma
pauperis.
M.L.B. announces a glaring weakness in informa pauperis analysis.
The doctrinal sea of which M.L.B. is a part, while well intentioned, is
unpredictable under the surface. This undertow threatens the stability and
reliability of in forma pauperis doctrine. It is time to establish a determi-
nate flow of constitutional analysis protecting court access. Material
equal protection offers a stabilizing solution.
Eric K. Weingarten*
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Editor Todd Ingram, University of Denver College of Law Professors Nancy Ehrenreich, Alan Chen,
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